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Book Review
ACCOUNT OF PROFITS, by Peter Devonshire 1
KRISH MAHARAJ 2
PETER DEVONSHIRE’S WORK PROVIDES, for the first time, a much-needed,

sustained examination of the remedy and procedure of accounting for profits
and the mechanics underlying the duty to account. Multijurisdictional in scope,
and thus not always authoritative for any particular jurisdiction, Devonshire’s
work is well worth consideration, not least because of its systematic and thorough
analysis of the subject. By this I mean that the book not only considers the decided
cases to describe what the law is, but goes further to discuss why the law is as it is,
or why it should be otherwise, and if so, how.
After a brief introduction, the book begins with an account of the historical
origins of the remedy going back to courts of common law in the thirteenth century.
From there it sets out the development of the account of profits (Account) from its
medieval roots through to its adoption by the Court of Chancery and then to its
modern application as a remedy granted chiefly in respect of equitable wrongs.3
Readers familiar with the remedy and the historical interplay of common law and
equity will already know some, if not much, of this tale. For those unfamiliar with
this aspect of English legal history, the retelling is useful and does much to demystify
what can at first appear to be an arcane subject. The term “account of profits” alone
requires some explanation in light of the fact that it sounds nothing like a remedy
and, as Devonshire explains, actually results from a centuries-long conflation of the
name of a procedure and a cause of action with the outcome sought.4
Having given this background, Devonshire then elaborates on the essential
elements of the Account and its functions.5 Here the book begins to connect the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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theoretical with the practical. Devonshire devotes attention, for instance, to a
plaintiff’s need to elect between receiving an Account or damages as the remedy
for a particular wrong.6 Given that the election of an Account is theoretically
tantamount to ratification of the defendant’s wrong, it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot pursue damages as well.7 The process is similar to that in waiver
of tort, which results in a similar election of remedies and whose name makes this
choice aspect clearer.
Chapters three through seven are devoted to exploring the application of
the Account as a remedial response to different causes of action. Four causes
of action, or types of wrong, are considered: breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
confidence, infringement of intellectual property, and common law wrongs. Each
action or wrong presents its own set of controversies and theoretical challenges that
influence the application and formulation of the Account in those circumstances. A
significant portion of each chapter focuses on these specifics. This approach has
its merits and the author ties these differentiating aspects in well with the theme
of the work overall.
The third and fourth chapters focus on breach of fiduciary duty and allowances
for breaching fiduciaries, respectively. A reader might initially assume that this
section of the text would be fairly prosaic because of how supposedly well settled
it is across all jurisdictions that a fiduciary found in breach of his or her fiduciary
duties is liable to account to the principal. Interestingly, this could not be further
from the truth.
What enlivens these chapters and makes for a much more engaging discussion
is Devonshire’s consideration of the modern contours of duty and breach, which
have been the subject of much forceful and vigorous debate for decades. This
debate has obviously had a significant effect on the potential availability of the
Account as a remedy, and the potential quantum of any award if a fiduciary is
found in breach. Cases like Warman International Pty Ltd v Dwyer and Murad
v Al-Saraj demonstrate practical instances where these changing attitudes have
resulted in significant changes to the calculation of an Account, either through
the court’s quantification of profit, or its decision to grant allowances.8 In that
connection, it is obviously important to understand the forces driving this debate
and the consequent calls for change to the fiduciary paradigm. Devonshire usefully
devotes a significant portion of the text to canvassing these issues.
6.
7.
8.

Ibid at 8-13.
Ibid at 13-17.
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The fifth and sixth chapters of the book branch out from the general
consideration of fiduciary duties to a consideration of the other two areas in
which the Account has a well-established home: breach of confidence and
intellectual property infringement. Interestingly, although the jurisdiction to
award an Account in respect of these wrongs is well established, there is in some
places a lack of awareness that an Account is an option in these circumstances.
As a result, the book’s thorough treatment of the causes of action and the factors
influencing the availability and the calculation of an Account when either
cause is proven is likely to be helpful to the uninformed or even the somewhat
mystified. The fact that a separate equitable duty of confidence can still be found
to exist despite the existence of a contractual duty of confidence, for instance, is
likely to be of great interest to those faced with a contractual breach of confidence
causing only nominal damage to the plaintiff, but bringing significant gain to the
defendant—Attorney General v Blake notwithstanding.9
The final chapter of the book tackles the perplexing issues of when, how, and
whether the Account ought to be available in respect of common law wrongs. The
genesis of the debate surrounding these issues goes back to Wrotham Park Estate
Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd and common law cases dealing with actions for
interference with property rights.10 The first part of the chapter focuses on these
cases but as Devonshire explains, what these cases actually deal with is a remedy
that is more closely related to common law damages as a result of its means of
assessment, which is reminiscent of the basic assessment of damages in tort.11
Going to the heart of the matter, Devonshire explains that the “gains” referred to
in these actions are purely notional and act only as a proxy for the hypothetical
loss arising from an involuntary subtraction from the owner’s “dominium.”12 In
[2000] UKHL 45, [2001] 1 AC 268 [Blake]; The Law Lords in Blake essentially decided
to grant an account of profits in respect of a purely contractual non-disclosure agreement
in the complete absence of any case for an equitable action for breach of confidence. In
that connection it is possible to cite Blake as authority for the proposition that a purely
contractual duty of non-disclosure can sound in the award of an Account. There is little
chance however, of any court accepting this argument, as few courts have been willing to
award Accounts in respect of contractual breaches in the decade since Blake was handed
down. The better view would be to accept that cases like Blake are somewhat extraordinary
and that a contractual duty of confidence will not attract the remedy of Account, and that
an Account will only be granted when there is a co-existing equitable duty of confidence
that has not been excluded by the terms of the parties’ contract, or been rendered otherwise
unavailable as a result of a change in circumstances. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 124-26.
10. [1974] 1 WLR 798, 2 All ER 321 [Wrotham Park].
11. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 164-65.
12. Ibid at 168.
9.
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other words, the assessment of these remedies is still focused on the identification
of something that a plaintiff-owner has lost, even if the loss exists only in theory.
This difference obviously distinguishes these remedies from true gain-based
remedies on the basis that there need not actually be a realized gain before the
remedy can be awarded. In fact, what has to be shown is that the wrongdoer
has done something for which the owner might have been able to charge (e.g.,
crossing an owner’s land). The wrongdoer may not have reaped any actual gain
as a result of his or her act by saving either time or money, but the owner will
nonetheless be entitled to an award equivalent to what the charge would have
been at market rates. The notional basis for awarding this type of remedy is what
is often called the “user principle.” As the name suggests, the remedy is really
only a charge for a hypothetical benefit conveyed, not the disgorgement of an
actual benefit received. Wrotham Park is not premised on the exact same fiction,
but relies on similar logic by equating the correct measure of damages with the
hypothetical sum that the parties would have agreed to in exchange for the
plaintiff agreeing to relax its strict contractual rights. With this explanation in
mind, the comparison between the remedies in these cases and ordinary common
law damages appears to be quite apt. The explanation thus lends a great deal of
credibility to this remedial approach, and may give great assistance to practitioners
faced with an appropriate set of facts.
Leaving aside Wrotham Park and the cases involving the user principle,
Devonshire continues chapter seven by turning to the real catalyst for the
discussion of gain-based remedies as a response to common law wrongs: the House
of Lords’ controversial decision in Blake.13 The controversy of Blake is due in no
small part to the fact that it potentially signified an upending of the established
order in contractual remedies. That said, the decision has not turned out to be
that significant, not least because of its limited practical effect. As Devonshire
points out, few courts have subsequently trodden the same path as the Law Lords
in Blake.14 The likely reason for this, as Devonshire’s discussion suggests, is that
many courts have simply not perceived the interests at stake in breach of contract
cases as being in need of protection by such a remedy.
In his foreword, the Honourable Michael Kirby expresses the view that the
book is timely.15 In one sense this is no doubt true. The significance of the book’s
contribution to the field of remedies could not be clearer than when it is viewed

13. Supra note 9.
14. Devonshire, supra note 1 at 124-25.
15. Ibid at viii.
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against the juristic and academic background of our time.16 In the long view,
however, it is startling that the Account has only now received this kind of
attention and sustained critique. By contrast, monographs on Equity’s two
other great remedial innovations have been with us since at least 1858 and 1867.17
Much like these earlier works, though, the book is pioneering in its drive to
bring clarity and coherence to a corpus grown increasingly thick with contradictory
cases and contrasting points of view. Indeed, it excels in marrying both theory
and practice to explain both the principles that underlie the Account and their
application, and to suggest reconciliation where the two diverge. Its insights in
the latter regard are piercing, and its prescriptions are likely to spur on much
academic and juristic development and debate in the years to come.
The unifying theme in Devonshire’s book is that remedial decisions are
driven and shaped by the cause of action for which they are awarded, which in
turn reflect the interests and rights those causes of action are intended to protect.
While this may sound trite, it is highly important for scholars and practitioners
alike to remember that a remedy is a response to a wrong. As such, in much the
same way that contractual damages are supposed to be the doppelgänger of the
primary obligation they replace, the Account too must be shaped by the interest
or interests that it is supposed to replace or preserve. This book’s focus on the
nature of the actions for which the Account is available, as much as on the Account
itself, is apposite for the purpose of demonstrating not only what the Account
does, but also what it ought to do.

16. See James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity, and Intellectual Property
(Oxford: Hart, 2002). See also Francesco Giglio, The Foundations of Restitution for Wrongs
(Oxford: Hart, 2007); Bank of America Canada v Mutual Trust Co, 2002 SCC 43, 2 SCR
601.
17. See Sir Edward Fry, A Treatise on The Specific Performance of Contracts: Including Those of
Public Companies, With A Preliminary Chapter on The Provisions of The Chancery Amendment
Act (London: Butterworths, 1858). See also William W Kerr, A Treatise on The Law and
Practice of Injunctions in Equity (London: W Maxwell & Sons, 1867).

